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Abstract 
Research suggests regional organisations ‘lock in’ their dominant political systems: democratic 
regionalism stabilises transitioning democracies whilst regionalism in autocratic regions is 
conversely associated with boosts in authoritarianism. Little research, however, has examined 
the regional-level trends and tactics that authoritarian leaders have sought to exploit to survive 
in democratising regions. This article focuses on the West Africa region which has seen 
considerable democratic progress over the last 20 years. However, while this progress is 
commendable (demonstrated by the recent transition of formerly autocratic Gambia), the 
consolidation process is not complete and, as in other parts of the world (such as the EU), 
democratic backsliding is a present risk. This article explains how authoritarian leaders have 
sought to use and benefitted from regional dynamics in an otherwise democratising region. It 
suggests that both formal and informal regional interactions have at times provided benefits 
that support authoritarianism and suggests a typology of the mechanisms through which this 
can happen. It serves as a potential guide for other regions in Africa yet to democratise to the 
level of West Africa, and as a guide to the types of regional authoritarianism-enhancing 
processes that could be used to support backsliding in (west) Africa and elsewhere. 
 
Introduction 
Recent literature suggests that regional organisations (ROs) help to support the dominant 
regime type in a region. ROs with a high level of ‘democratic density’ provide a climate that 
boosts democracy (Pevehouse 2002a, 530) whilst, regional cooperation between autocratic 
states has been shown to boost authoritarian members (Ambrosio 2008; Silitski 2006). Indeed, 
within the broader research focus on authoritarian states’ efforts to resist democratisation and 
support regime survival, international cooperation, and regionalism in particular, have surfaced 
as core pillars of authoritarian rule (Kelly 2007; Jackson 2010; Ambrosio 2008; Allison 2008; 
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Söderbaum 2010; Yom 2014). In the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, for example, 
ROs such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) have emerged respectively as means of protecting authoritarian regimes from internal 
and external democratisation pressures - often supported by an ‘illiberal’ regional hegemon 
(such as Russia/China and Saudi Arabia) (Börzel 2015; Kamrava 2012; Libman 2007) and 
sometimes assisted by so-called ‘black knights’ from the West that support, or turn a blind eye 
towards, un-democratic regimes (Ambrosio 2014).  
The West African region is, at one level, one of the success stories of global moves towards 
democracy. Despite some significant challenges, since the 1990s the region has seen 
considerable increases in democracy levels, supported by both the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and extra-regional actors such as the EU. However, while 
ECOWAS has been tasked with promoting democracy since at least the Cotonou Agreement 
of 1993 (and especially since the in 1999 protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001 protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance – see below), the West African region has had a high degree of plurality in terms 
of democracy/autocracy during the subsequent period and thus overall a relatively low (albeit 
increasing) ‘democratic density’ for much of the last two decades. States that underwent earlier 
democratic transitions in the region, such as Ghana and Cape Verde, have sat for years 
alongside authoritarian leaders, such as Gambia’s recently ousted Yaya Jammeh. A number of 
West African states today lie somewhere in the middle – ‘big man’ led, neo-patrimonial, semi-
authoritarian hybrid states (Birikorang 2013). This division is reflected very much in 
representations of the region. West Africa is often presented on the one hand as an area replete 
with potential and opportunity (Bloomberg Professional 2015). On the other hand, the region 
is often discussed through representations focusing on poor governance and conflict (IRIN 
2014). These latter two are interrelated, with poor governance often having been a root cause 
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of violent upheaval (Annan 2014). Both of these representations of West Africa also play into 
the internal and external constructions of the region and subsequently, the interventions made 
by external and regional actors. Western fears over China’s ‘Scramble for Africa’, for example, 
can be seen not just to reflect fears of economic competition, but also of normative competition 
with the prospect of African states diverging from their democratising paths (Taylor 2011, 
130). Similarly, both Western actors and the ECOWAS Commission frame their respective 
political and military interventions on grounds of establishing or promoting good governance 
(EEAS 2015; ECOWAS 2015).  
This of course raises the question of what role regionalism has played for the more authoritarian 
members of ECOWAS. Has the regional level represented a wholly hostile environment for 
them in terms of their hold on power? Or can authoritarian states still derive regime survival 
benefits from regional level interactions in democratising regions? This article examines the 
role played by regional dynamics (both regional integration in ECOWAS and the African 
Union, and formal/informal cooperation in and outside of these bodies) in the support of 
democracy and autocracy in the West African region. It suggests that while ECOWAS, and the 
ECOWAS Commission in particular, have a positive record of supporting democratic 
developments and sanctioning authoritarian backsliding, other regionalist dynamics have been 
used to support authoritarian states and create space for hybrid systems of un-democratic rule.  
The contribution of this article is two-fold. Firstly, it proposes a typology of the mechanisms 
by which regionalism can further the interests of authoritarian states outside of the ‘deliberate 
denial of democracy’ forms of authoritarian protection seen in other regions of the world such 
as Eurasia and the Gulf. Most regional support for authoritarianism in these regions comes 
about through deliberate actions that aim to bolster autocracy. In the case of West Africa, with 
a clear overall trend towards democracy, regional benefits for authoritarian leaders do not 
generally take this form, but rather a series of more subtle mechanisms that reflect the more 
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complicated balance between democracy and autocracy and the recent history of the region. 
These include the subversion of benefits intended (nowadays) for democratic states, difficult 
trade-offs (especially between stability and democracy), the rejection of Western values seen 
as political impositions and the ability to derive benefits from multiple fora i.e. ECOWAS and 
the AU (forum shopping). These mechanisms are then highlighted and examined in the context 
of West African regionalism, demonstrating how this regionalism has presented politico-
security and legitimacy-boosting benefits for authoritarian West African leaders.  
Beyond the academic contribution, the findings of this article are also relevant in policy terms, 
both in West Africa and further afield. While the more extreme cases of authoritarianism in 
West Africa are now largely historic (with the removal of Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 
2014 and Yaya Jammeh in Gambia in 2016, two of the remaining long term autocrats are now 
gone), it would be nevertheless complacent to assume that the trajectory towards democracy is 
now complete in the region. Despite the very real progress in terms of democratic transition in 
West Africa, democracy is not yet consolidated in many West African states. Democratic 
backsliding is a real danger in West Africa as it is in other parts of the world, including Europe, 
Latin America and the former Soviet Union (Diamond, Plattner and Walker 2016, 3). The 
mechanisms and actions described in this article could be used by any future democratic 
backsliders and may embolden them to launch more egregious attempts to subvert democracy. 
The information in this article is thus of use to those who would seek to understand both how 
previous authoritarian leaders sought to use regional cooperation to survive in power and to 
ensure that others would not be able to do the same in the future. Secondly, there are other 
regional bodies in Africa such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
which have experienced democratising trends and have democratising mandates but have 
mixed memberships in terms of democratic standards and lower overall standards than 
 6 
ECOWAS. Knowledge of how authoritarian leaders have sought to use to regional dynamics 
to support their regimes in ECOWAS is also relevant in this wider African context.  
In terms of running order, the article is divided into five sections. The first discusses the role 
that democracy-promoting regional institutions can have on democracy and contrasts this with 
the autocratic-boosting effects of other, more authoritarian, regionalisms. The second section 
assesses the positive role that regional bodies (most notably the ECOWAS Commission) have 
played in promoting democracy in West Africa, as well as also highlighting the on-going 
challenges of democratisation in the region. The third section discusses five different 
mechanisms by which regional cooperation can assist authoritarian states outlining those that 
are likely to apply in the case of regional cooperation in West Africa. Section four examines 
how regional cooperation in the West African region has provided politico-security and 
legitimacy benefits for authoritarian governments. Section five concludes. 
Regionalism and the ‘Lock-In’ of Dominant Regime Types 
Recent Political Science literature suggests that regional organisations (ROs) have the capacity 
to ‘lock in’ the dominant political system type within a region (Pevehouse 2002a; Ambrosio 
2008; Börzel 2016). Indeed, ROs have played a significant role both in respective waves of 
democratisation across the globe and the so-called ‘backlash against democracy’ instigated by 
a number of authoritarian states since the mid-2000s (Carothers 2006). Regionalism – both in 
the form of formal regional integration and less formal regional cooperation – appears to play 
into dynamics of (regional) systemic heteronomy and homogeneity identified by Raymond 
Aron in the 1960s. He suggested that homogenous systems of states – those with states 
comprising similar types of government – were likely to be both more stable and that states 
would thus seek to homogenise (in regime type terms) their environments (Aron 1966, 100). 
Regional bodies – backed up by regional powers (Hartman 2016; Kamrava 2012; Ambrosio, 
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2008) – are one means through which states can collectively encourage more homogenous 
regional political systems. 
Regionalism Boosting Democracy? 
As Pevehouse (2002a; 2002b) has observed, ROs with high ‘democratic density’ have a 
propensity to bolster democratic transitions in member states. He suggests a number of factors 
that contribute to these transitions in member countries, namely; pressure from the ROs 
themselves to democratise, credible reassurance from other democratic states and socialisation 
of democratising leaders in democratic norms (Pevehouse 2002a, 519). A wide literature on 
the European Union (EU), for example, has highlighted the socialisation and conditionality 
role that the EU has played in the democratisation of its prospective and new member states 
(Schimmelfennig 2002; 2016). Indeed, the EU’s conditionality has been shown to bolster 
support for democracy and facilitate transition in Eastern European states. Its effect, however, 
on states once they have joined the EU is less clear (Schimmelfennig 2016, 192; Börzel 2014, 
16). Policies of the Fidesz government in Hungary, and more recently of the governing Law 
and Justice party in Poland, have, for example, raised questions about both governments’ 
commitment to democracy. Overall, however, the EU’s record is good with new European 
member states remaining generally above the level of democracy in non-EU post-communist 
countries. In Latin America, Ribeiro-Hoffman (2007) has argued that MERCOSUR has used 
democratic clauses to address democratic deficits and backsliding in member states (notably 
Paraguay). Similarly, Parish and Peceny (2002) have argued that the Organization of American 
States (OAS) has utilised its influence to promote the collective defence of democracy in the 
Americas. At the time of writing, Venezuela has recently been threatened with action by the 
OAS over its record on democracy (Wilkinson 2017). Taken together, regional organisations 
characterised by democracy appear to provide an environment conducive to the support of 
democratisation (notwithstanding some instances of backsliding as mentioned above).  
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Regionalism Boosting Autocrats? 
In regions with higher ‘autocratic density’, regional cooperation has conversely assisted 
authoritarian states to stay in power. Indeed, ‘regime boosting’ or ‘protective’ regionalism is 
seen as both a tool states can use to manage challenges to their regimes (Allison 2008; 
Söderbaum 2010; Riggirozzi 2010) and as a core part of the global ‘backlash against 
democracy’ (Carothers, 2006).  
Perhaps the most marked politico-military examples of this trend was the 2011 Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) intervention to quell unrest in fellow GCC member state Bahrain 
(comprising a number of GCC states led by Saudi Arabia) (Kamrava 2012; Ayoob 2011). 
However, beyond this very visible case, in both the Gulf and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
regional bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and the GCC have also sought to limit domestic political threats by 
facilitating the sharing of intelligence on dissidents and the extradition of threatening 
individuals (Toumi 2013; Cooley 2012). In addition, in both regions, regional cooperation has 
provided a forum for authoritarian learning and policy transfer – facilitating the spread of 
authoritarian ‘political technologies’ (Silitski 2010, 342; Yom 2014, 60).  
Similarly, in the economic realm one can observe regional cooperation employed to bolster the 
stability of autocratic regimes. Economic regional bodies such as the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU) in the FSU, and the GCC in the Gulf, offer autocratic states a stronger negotiating 
position in the world stage. While this does not inherently support autocracy (regionalism does 
the same for all members of regional bodies whether autocratic or democratic), for autocracies 
it can present a valuable opportunity to reduce dependence on the West and protect rent-
generating industries that provide the funds of state patronage. Similarly, regional cooperation 
in the GCC, Eurasia and Latin America facilitates financial transfers from richer to poorer 
regional partners. Russia has, for its part, heavily subsidised neighbouring EEU-member 
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Belarus and remittances from Central Asian migrants working visa-free in Russia play a crucial 
economic role in CIS countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The richer GCC states have 
offered generous financial assistance to Bahrain (and Oman) in the wake of the uprisings there. 
In Latin America, the regional organization the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de 
Nuestra América (ALBA) has, in conjunction with ‘PetroCaribe’ - a regional mechanism for 
distributing subsidised Venezuelan oil to other Caribbean and Latin American states - 
facilitated financial flows from a richer member Venezuela to poorer ones, such as Cuba 
(Piccone and Trinkunas 2014).  
Regional bodies can also play a key role in terms of regime legitimacy. Following the ‘Colour 
Revolutions’ in the FSU, where flawed elections were trigger points for uprisings, the CIS has 
sent observers to post-Soviet elections to counter Western monitors who were accused of 
delegitimising leaders and promoting “regime change” (Silitski 2010, 348; Fawn 2006, 1144; 
Cooley 2012, 110). This has been followed by the SCO who, since 2005, has also sent monitors 
to post-Soviet elections (Boland 2011, 16; Cooley 2012, 114). The outcomes of these election 
missions have always been favourable for incumbent governments – regardless of their 
democratic character. Elsewhere in the Gulf, the GCC has consistently promoted traditional 
cultures as sources of legitimacy (Islam, tribal culture and monarchy) (Haimerl 2013, 10; 
Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Colombo 2012, 10). Finally, as Söderbaum (2010) has noted, 
well-publicised regional summits and informal cooperation between leaders provides a means 
by which state leaders can mutually support each other’s legitimation and bolster each other’s 
public image.  
Regionalism, ECOWAS and Democratisation in West Africa 
While its impact has been limited in a number of ways (discussed below), ECOWAS (the 
principal regional body in West Africa) has sought – in many cases successfully – to ‘lock in’ 
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and support democracy in the West Africa region, especially following a number of governance 
and security crises. ECOWAS was established in 1975 with an economic rather than 
democracy/good governance, or peace and security mandate (Yabi 2010, 10). While none of 
its members were democratic at its inception (Hartmann, 2013, 8), this changed after the Cold 
War as ECOWAS began to develop a good governance agenda following the devastating 
security conditions of the 1990s where military conflicts (especially Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea) and repeated military coups undermined the political and economic development of 
the region. These crises were thought to have their roots in poor governance, maladministration 
and corruption, the absence of effective accountability, ethnic marginalization and limited 
checks on power (Annan 2014, 3). Reflecting this, ECOWAS bolstered its democratic mandate 
and was the first RO on the African continent to institutionalise an agenda on democracy and 
good governance (Hartmann, 2013, 7). However, this means of course that, unlike the EU for 
example, ECOWAS did not have good governance and democracy standards as a criterion of 
membership and thus both the regional organisation itself, and the states within it, have 
democratised in tandem. 
In 1991, ECOWAS states issued a ‘Declaration of Political Principles’ that expressed the desire 
‘to promote democracy in the sub-region on the basis of political pluralism and respect for 
fundamental human rights’ (ECOWAS 1991). These principles were reaffirmed with the 
signing of the Cotonou Treaty – the Revised ECOWAS Treaty – in 1993 (Hartmann 2013, 11). 
However, the major institutional changes in terms of democracy and good governance came at 
the end of the 1990s. The 1999 ‘Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security’ strengthened ECOWAS commitment 
to democracy (albeit still quite vaguely) and, crucially, established a mechanism by which 
states could intervene in the event of massive humans rights abuse or an unconstitutional 
change of government (based on the decision of nine out of the fifteen states in the ECOWAS 
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‘Mediation and Security Council’) (Hartman 2013, 18). In doing so, it instigated a strong means 
of intervening in crises on the side of human rights and democracy. The most explicit definition 
of ECOWAS’ role in the promotion of good governance, however, came in the 2001 
‘Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance’ (Yabi 2010, 12). This 
document outlines much more specifically the democratic features that ECOWAS states should 
possess (including, inter alia, stipulations on elections, separation of powers, changes to 
constitutions, the apolitical role of the military etc.) and agrees a set of convergence criteria 
that states should aim to meet (Hartmann 2013, 19).  
However, while these initiatives significantly advanced the democratic character of ECOWAS 
and its crisis reaction mechanisms, the 1999 Protocol and 2001 Supplementary Protocol are 
much weaker, by contrast, on measures to promote good governance in normal times (i.e. in 
the absence of major upheaval) (Hartman 2013, 18). Indeed, due to the limited scope for the 
active promotion of democracy in member states, ECOWAS (in particular the ECOWAS 
Commission) has only made notable efforts towards the protection of democracy, in practice, 
in the wake of political and security crises where the Commission is empowered to act 
(Hartmann 2013, 35; Bappah 2014, 96). A number of recent examples include responses to 
unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). In several cases of UCG, such as coups and 
attempts to illegally extend presidential term limits (c.f. Niger, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, 
Gambia amongst others) ECOWAS has sanctioned rule-violators and insisted on return to 
democratic governance. ECOWAS has then overseen transitions and monitored subsequent 
elections. Outside of these crisis periods, however, the ECOWAS Commission has been limited 
in its capacity for action and ECOWAS states (many of whom with less than perfect democratic 
records) have been, perhaps unsurprisingly, reluctant to encourage democracy regionally. 
Indeed, overall ECOWAS’s record on democracy is thus mixed in its effects. Despite the 
activism of the Commission and the support for democratic change in response to crises, 
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outside of major upheavals the body as a whole is dependent for democracy support on the 
ECOWAS heads of state (who have often been not keen to promote democracy) and the 
mechanisms for actively promoting democracy before crises emerge (while envisaged in the 
protocols) are weak and largely uninitiated (Bappah 2014, 97). 
Regional Support for Authoritarian Leaders: Mechanisms 
While many instances of ‘protective’ or regime-boosting regionalism examined in the literature 
(Allison 2008; Söderbaum 2010) reflect a conscious regional effort to subvert democracy, this 
is unlikely today in the West Africa region (especially from ECOWAS) given the clear mandate 
for democracy promotion that has evolved over the last two decades. Here we are talking of a 
democratising region with an RO possessing an explicit mandate to promote democracy. It is 
nevertheless a region with a concurrent coexistence between more authoritarian and more 
democratic regimes and, as the section below will argue, numerous means through which 
authoritarian leaders have been able to derive benefits from regional dynamics. This makes it 
quite different from for example the overwhelmingly democratic EU or the overwhelmingly 
autocratic SCO or GCC where the support for regime type is explicit (in the EU case) or at 
least entirely deliberate and evident in its autocratic effects (in the latter two cases for example). 
The picture in West Africa is much more nuanced, born of the far less determinate balance 
between regime types, the fact that all ECOWAS states were (largely authoritarian) members 
before ECOWAS was mandated to promote democracy and the challenging, albeit generally 
positive, moves towards democracy in the region. 
This section outlines five different mechanisms by which regional cooperation can provide 
regime-support benefits for authoritarian leaders. It is crucial to make a distinction between 
these mechanisms to fully understand how ostensibly democratic regional organization, such 
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as ECOWAS, may have come to offer space for authoritarian leaders. The five mechanisms 
are as follows: 
 
1) Deliberate autocratic benefits/denial of democracy. Firstly, as described above, in 
contrast to their stated objectives and reflecting the will of some member states, a regional body 
might offer deliberate support to authoritarian states in an effort to quell the risk of democratic 
transition, as other regional bodies such as the GCC and SCO have done in the face of protests 
and uprisings. This seems an unlikely mechanism to expect in the case of regional cooperation 
in West Africa. 
2) (Formal) Benefits of regionalism are subverted. It could also be the case, however, 
that regional bodies provide benefits for their members as a whole that bolster democracies and 
autocracies equally, or that measures designed to promote democracy or other public goods 
can be (ab)used by authoritarian regimes to their own advantage. Söderbaum (2004) has talked 
of ‘sovereignty boosting’ regionalism in Africa for example. Such effects are likely to enhance 
the capacity of weak states regardless of regime type.  
3) Difficult trade-offs can benefit authoritarian leaders. It might also be the case that 
regional bodies and external powers are faced with unenviable trade-offs that might work to 
the advantage of authoritarian leaders, the most fundamental and common being trade-offs 
between security and human rights, and similarly, stability and democracy. Equally possible in 
some cases is a trade-off between democracy and development. Here ROs may take an action 
that boosts an authoritarian leader, but only because the alternative (insecurity/instability/weak 
development) is seen to be worse. 
4) Rejection of Western norms. Regionalism can offer authoritarian leaders the capacity 
to boost their image through the rejection of Western norms that are claimed to be cultural or 
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political ‘neo-colonial’ impositions that work to the disadvantage of African leaders. This can 
function in two senses. On the one hand regionalism can offer a collective rejection of external 
values that are seen as being imposed by external actors. On other hand. It is also possible that 
regional bodies may be used for regime-boosting purposes by authoritarian states against the 
wishes or interests of the RO. Unpopular regional policies that are seen to be Western in origin, 
for example, may be rejected by authoritarian states for their own benefits. Alternatively, 
authoritarian leaders may blame ROs for difficult problems and avoid having to deal with them 
domestically. This benefit is common in democratic ROs such as the EU where member state 
leaders can either blame the EU for unpopular things they would actually like to do or whether 
they can define themselves against the EU values to boost legitimacy and support amongst 
certain demographics that are critical of the EU. 
5) Overlapping regionalism/regional ‘forum shopping’: Finally, while one regional 
body may advance a more democratic agenda, it is possible that authoritarian states or their 
regional/extra regional supporters may, in a given instance, use or advocate the policies of 
another overlapping regional body with less reliable democratic credentials. The role of the 
African Union in this regard will be touched on below. Equally possible is the utilisation of 
alternative forums (including informal ones – see below). 
Regional Dynamics and Authoritarianism in West Africa 
Having discussed the mechanisms by which regionalism may support autocracy in West Africa, 
it is now necessary to examine how these have manifested in practice. This section discusses a 
number of the means by which authoritarian leaders in West Africa have been aided by regional 
cooperation to defend themselves against internal and external threats. The different 
mechanisms described above (subverted, trade-offs, norm rejection and forum-shopping) by 
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which regionalism can be used to support authoritarianism, both within ECOWAS and the AU, 
will be highlighted and discussed. 
  
Subverted Politico-Security Benefits 
In the politico-security realm, regional cooperation in West Africa offers two subverted 
benefits in particular for authoritarian leaders: regional coup deterrence and positions of 
regional security importance. The first – regional deterrence of coups – assists with what is 
historically the primary domestic threat to autocrats globally (see, Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 
2014). ECOWAS and the African Union have developed strong protocols to respond to 
‘unconstitutional changes of government’ (UCG), especially coups d’état (Witt 2013, 259; 
Omorogbe 2011). In 2000, the (then) Organisation for African Unity (OAU) outlined a number 
of conditions that would constitute UCG, namely; military coups, intervention by mercenaries, 
replacement of government by armed dissidents and refusing to step down having lost an 
election (Witt 2013, 259). The 2007 AU African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (in force since 2012) widened the focus to include unlawful constitutional changes 
and barred coup-participants from taking part in post-coup elections. The ECOWAS Protocol 
on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) presents similar provisions, but goes further, 
permitting possible military action in the event of UCG.  
However, the history of anti-coup actions at a regional level in Africa predates widespread 
democratisation in the continent and the original motivations for seeking to avoid coups under 
the Organisation for African Unity (the precursor to the African Union) were order and stability 
preservation rather than democracy preservation. States (of all types) in the region feared that 
they might themselves also be removed in a coup (perhaps backed by foreign powers) and 
wished to deter this from happening (Cowell 2011, 335). As Cowell (2011, 335) notes, while 
the 1990/2000s saw a growth in the democratisation agenda and adoption protocols outlining 
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commitments to democracy within African regional organisations, in practice, the application 
of these protocols ‘has focused almost exclusively on the threat of unconstitutional changes of 
government and not on enforcing norms promoting good governance’. Indeed, rules against 
unconstitutional changes of government work to the benefit of incumbent states (including 
authoritarian ones) as a lack of prior domestic democratic governance does not stop the AU 
and other regional bodies condemning, excluding and sanctioning coup leaders (Omorogbe 
2011). This includes cases where their coups potentially may have made a path toward 
democracy more likely or when militaries had originally intervened to stop unconstitutional 
behaviour (Omorogbe 2011). These provisions represent an example of ‘subverted benefits’ in 
that, while coup provisions do have the effect of protecting democratic orders and help to 
punish coup leaders after a coup (which is today their stated purpose in ECOWAS), in practice 
they function to deter coups in both democratic and autocratic states alike. Similarly, this 
benefit also derives from trade-offs between the stability afforded by an entrenched regime and 
the risks associated with unpredictable and often deleterious domestic upheaval.   
Beyond coups however, regional cooperation can also aid authoritarian leaders by increasing 
their importance as security actors and, in turn, their leverage vis-à-vis Western actors who are 
in turn less likely to push democratisation. Autocratic leaders have also used (and tried to use) 
ECOWAS as a means of boosting their regional security importance through regional conflict 
mediation. Blaise Compaoré, former (authoritarian) president of Burkina Faso was valued as a 
‘regional leader’ by France and some West African states for his role as a conflict ‘mediateur’. 
Indeed, he was appointed by ECOWAS as a mediator in the Mali crisis (Panapress 2012). These 
mediation roles, according to one commentator, ‘bolstered the president’s credentials as a 
peacemaker – and largely exonerated him from Western criticism over his dubious democratic 
record’ (Dodman 2014). Indeed, Compaoré was thought to be ‘un ami fidèle de la France’ and 
pillar of Paris’s ‘francafrique’ policy, in addition to being a US ally in the region (Jaffré 2010). 
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Such opportunities (while possibly prudent from a security point of view) demonstrate external 
actors’ trade offs and the subversion of official regional posts that can be used to boost the 
prestige of leaders and may make them more likely to receive support from ‘black Knight’ 
Western powers (and consequently thus less likely to be ‘dropped’ by them when they face 
political challenges). The particular case of Compaoré is all the more problematic for the 
destabilising role he is thought to have played in numerous West African conflicts (Campbell 
2014). Similarly, Wikileaks cables reveal that Gambian president Jammeh sought to boost his 
international recognition by being seen as a regional security broker and negotiator – although 
such efforts were less successful than Compaoré in his case (US State Department 2001) 
 
Trade-offs and ‘forum shopping’ around elections  
Regionalism can aid authoritarian leaders with another important element of regime survival -  
legitimation around flawed elections – and this presents often difficult trade-offs for regional 
bodies and opportunities for forum shopping. Many of the states in West Africa either have 
been or currently are ‘competitive authoritarian’ or ‘hybrid’ orders: states where political 
power is ostensibly achieved through winning elections, but where elections are controlled in 
such a way as to make victory for the incumbents highly likely. Under such circumstances, 
elections serve a fundamental role of legitimating an authoritarian leader’s tenure on power 
(rather than being a genuine means for leadership change) (D’anieri 2014, 80). Regional bodies 
(such as ECOWAS and the AU) play an important part in elections given their election 
monitoring roles. ECOWAS and the AU (the latter in particular), have both come under 
criticism for sanctioning flawed elections with their results, at times, diverging from 
international observers. Both the AU and ECOWAS conduct relatively short election-
monitoring missions that focus more on the technical administration of elections rather than 
the broader electoral process (that often lasts many weeks). ECOWAS is considered to adopt a 
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‘developmental’ rather than ‘judgemental’ approach to election monitoring, seeking to 
‘improve, rather than ostracise’ (Mediation Support Network, 2013). Indeed, while 
ECOWAS’s democratic standards are more substantive than the AU overall, it has faced 
criticism over its election monitoring. Examples include the monitoring of elections in Togo in 
2005 where ECOWAS (along with the AU) is thought to have given (despite serious 
irregularities) broadly positive assessments to the election of Faure Gnassingbé (Bittiger, n.d.). 
Part of the challenge in the Togo case was ECOWAS’s joint mandate (with attendant trade-
offs) as both mediator and then subsequent validator of elections (Bittiger, n.d.). ECOWAS 
was tasked with both finding a solution of the crisis, and evaluating the elections that were part 
of that same process. Bittiger (n.d.) suggests that they were then accused of ‘white-washing’ 
the result in effort to promote stability in Togo. Some thus fear that joint stability/election 
monitoring mandates may create trade-off incentives for ECOWAS to approve less-than-
perfect election processes. 
ECOWAS has in the past refused to monitor some elections over democracy and human rights 
concerns. Gambian presidential elections in 2011 were boycotted by ECOWAS because the 
country did not have, according to ECOWAS, a political environment conducive to holding 
free and fair elections (BBC 2011). The African Union, by contrast, and representing in this 
case an alternative forum, did send observers in 2011 and found the results to be credible and 
the conduct of the elections impressive (Clottey 2011). Their results were indeed quite 
divergent from the opinion of ECOWAS, with the head of the AU mission arguing they ‘give 
them [the Gambian government] a good pass mark. On the whole, they did more than well’ 
(Clottey 2011). Election monitoring provides a crucial mark of legitimacy on elections – 
especially important in competitive authoritarian regimes. 
 
Rejection of Western values 
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Regional cooperation can help to challenge Western authority and the universalism of Western-
derived international norms. A recent example has been AU efforts to reduce the influence of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa. The majority of ICC prosecutions have been 
against African individuals, including a number of state leaders including President Bashir of 
Sudan and President Kenyatta of Kenya (du Plessis, Maluwa and O’Reilly 2013). The 
disproportionate number of African prosecutions has led to suggestions of ‘neo-colonial’ bias 
in ICC cases and has been strongly resisted by the AU. The actions of the court have been 
thought by some to violate the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of the concerned countries’ 
(Jalloh 2010, 2). Some have suggested that the rejection of ICC in Africa (which is not 
universally rejected by African governments) is driven by autocratic leaders who are concerned 
that they themselves may one day ‘need to’ take action that would contravene the courts 
principles (The Economist 2011). Prosecutions (both actual and attempted) have been linked 
to post-election violence. Laurent Gbagbo, former president of Cote d’Ivoire, is currently 
before the ICC charged with instigating post-election violence in 2010/11 and the ICC was for 
a time seeking to try Uhuru Kenyatta, the serving President of Kenya, over accusations of 
instigation of election violence in 2007/8. However, while ICC denunciation may be self-
serving in some cases for particular leaders, the wider rejection of the ICC also demonstrates a 
number of the founding values of the AU that hold traction across Africa; in particular, pan-
African solidarity, the reinforcement of an ‘African’ way of doing things and rejection of 
universality of values (and jurisdictions), the re-enforcement of state sovereignty (a guarantor 
of the latter) and the rejection of perceived neo-colonialism. However, legitimate promotion of 
international pluralism can open the way for authoritarian leaders to reject pluralism at a 
domestic level. In such cases, the assertion of sovereignty, while the right of all states, can be 
subverted and may work to the advantage of authoritarian leaders.  
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An interview with former Gambian President Yahya Jammeh on the eve of Gambia’s recent 
celebrations of 50 years of independence exemplifies the way in which pro-sovereignty, anti 
neo-colonialist arguments can be used for authoritarian legitimation by linking democratic 
states in West Africa to neo-colonial powers. Jammeh suggests that all Gambians should ask 
themselves ‘what is democracy’ and then answers his question by stating that: ‘it is not the 
‘derimocracy’ [sic] where I am here, but representing foreign interest, and I allow them to rob 
my country of her resources and later you call me one of the leaders of Africa and paste me on 
their mass media’. He suggests that a number of ECOWAS states are led by and funded by 
‘Western powers’ and argues that this is negative trend that affects both ECOWAS and the AU 
(Jammeh 2015). ECOWAS, according Jammeh (2015) works against ‘independent African 
leaders who have a sense of dignity and pride [and] who want Africa to be something better 
than what we are today’ (with the implication being that he is one of these independent leaders). 
Here Jammeh sets himself in partial opposition to ECOWAS, and employs a de-legitimation 
of ECOWAS as a means of self-legitimation (in a strategy that is not dissimilar to some British 
Governments’ approaches to the EU). Reflecting his anti (neo) colonialist legitimation strategy, 
Jammeh presents himself as opposed to some ECOWAS decisions that he argues are neo-
colonial impositions, noting, ‘when you look at most of the ECOWAS decisions that we always 
object to are decisions that did not come from us but that came from outside – the West, the 
same thing they are trying to do with AU’ (Jammeh 2015).  
Overall, the West African/ECOWAS position on resisting the West is less strident than that of 
the AU as a whole. But this middle ground, however, puts ECOWAS in an unenviable position. 
If it moves to far to promote ‘Western’ values it can face criticism on grounds of its 
independence with the more authoritarian elements in West Africa de-legitimising the 
organization for their own purposes. Moving against ‘Western values’ would bring pressure 
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from the West and go against ECOWAS’s stated objectives, despite the fact that it might be 
positive in terms of domestic legitimacy (and may well be justified at times).  
 
Subversion of regional fora and positions for regime boosting 
Regional fora and formal positons has also been used to boost the ‘big man’ image of 
authoritarian state leaders and promote their regimes. Authoritarian rule in many states rests on 
various forms of charismatic legitimacy where the legitimacy of the state as a whole is 
associated with the legitimacy of its leader (Osaghae 2010, 408-9; Söderbaum 2010, 5). Such 
images, however, require cultivation and benefit from international recognition. A core feature 
of regionalism that facilitates this image-boosting is ‘summitry’ – high profile and formal 
meetings that receive much attention where leaders can demonstrate the importance and 
prominence of their regimes and support each other through joint legitimation (Söderbaum 
2010, 7). Informal gatherings of regional leaders can potentially have similar effects as well. 
For example, despite Gambia’s poor democracy and human rights record, the 50th anniversary 
celebrations of Gambian independence in 2015 were attended by a range of regional foreign 
dignitaries including President Mahama of Ghana (then chairman of ECOWAS), President Vaz 
of Guinea Bissau, President Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, Vice President Sambo of Nigeria 
and Senegalese Vice President Dionne (Amin 2015). While the event was not a formal meeting 
in ECOWAS or the AU, this form of visible public support from regional leaders lends a degree 
of legitimacy to Jammeh and boosted his public image (also interesting given that ECOWAS 
as a whole boycotted the Gambian elections in 2011 as noted above). Drawing attention to this 
support, Jammeh publically noted his appreciation for their having attended the celebrations in 
his Independence Day speech (Amin 2015). Such actions appear to fit within a specific regional 
strategy employed by the Gambian leader. Indeed, Jammeh’s West African strategy was 
reportedly driven more by a personal desire to be seen as a regional diplomacy broker and 
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charismatic regional leader, than by efforts to achieve substantive policy goals (US State 
Department 2001). 
In the same vein, ROs offer positions of responsibility that can be used to boost the status of 
leaders. Both ECOWAS and the AU, for example, have rotating position of Chairperson. This 
is a prestigious position, which affords the holder a number of important benefits including 
high levels of regional and domestic visibility, support from other leaders and a key role in 
regional developments. These positions, somewhat like summits, afford leaders with 
opportunities and resources to present themselves to their citizenries as important, 
statesmanlike and key to the regional politics of West Africa – key sources of legitimation and 
image boosting. A good number of the individuals who have been ECOWAS chairperson have 
been leaders of democratically elected governments (especially recently), but other 
authoritarian leaders such as Blaise Compaoré (Chairman 2007-08), and others such as former 
Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (Chairman 2008-2010) who was elected under 
widely criticised elections (BBC, 2007) have occupied the position. Indeed, a high level of 
democracy is not a precondition for being voted into this role and the rotating nature of the 
position and the fact that authoritarian or weakly democratic leaders can fulfil this role provides 
an additional regional benefit in terms of legitimation. Such a situation is less of a risk presently 
in West Africa given the successful transition of most states (and the recent transitions of some 
of the most autocratic i.e. Gambia), but it should not be discounted considering the precarious 
position of democracy in some West African states. This is however a bigger issue in the AU 
where the make-up of member states is far less democratic overall and where several 
authoritarian leaders, including former Libyan President Muammar Gadhafi (2009-10) and 
President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe (2015-16), have held the position of Chairperson in 
recent years. 
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Conclusion 
In a number of regions across the globe, different regionalisms have played a crucial role in 
influencing both the spread of, and resistance to, democracy. The West African region is no 
exception, with the region as a whole, and ECOWAS in particular, having a positive record 
when it comes to democratic transition. When focusing on the link between 
democracy/autocracy and regime type, the region presents a particularly interesting example 
given the regime type heterogeneity in West Africa over the last two decades since ECOWAS 
started its transition to democracy. In most cases regions with a high ‘democratic density’ have 
encouraged democracy, and regions with high levels of authoritarianism have developed to 
offer a defence against democratisation. The level of democratisation in West Africa, however, 
has been mixed but growing over the last few decades, and this therefore raises the question of 
how authoritarian and hybrid states seek to survive in a region that is increasingly committed 
to democracy.  
As this article has shown, regional cooperation in West Africa and engagement in the wider 
AU, despite the increasingly democratic outlook and mandate of ECOWAS and the AU, has at 
times offered political and legitimacy benefits to the more authoritarian leaders in the region. 
This article offered a typology of the different mechanisms through which regionalism in West 
Africa aids authoritarian and hybrid states to understand the means by which this happens. In 
West Africa, we do not really see a deliberate regional denial of democracy (as seen in other 
instances of regional cooperation such as the Gulf), but rather we a see a number of different 
mechanisms that operate more. They are: A) that less democratic leaders have been able to take 
advantage of provisions designed in most cases for other (more democratic) purposes and use 
them to their advantage; B) that difficult trade-offs exist between security and democracy, and 
that these sometimes work to the advantage of authoritarianism; C) that leaders can counter-
intuitively use contentious especially Western-derived policies or actions at a regional level to 
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legitimise themselves; and D) that overlapping memberships in multiple regional blocs (in this 
case ECOWAS and the AU) can sometimes offer advantages for authoritarian leaders. Building 
on these mechanisms, this article has drawn empirical attention to a number of the political and 
legitimacy-boosting benefits more authoritarian leaders have been able to derive from West 
African regionalism. In an example of subverted benefits, formal positions of influence, such 
as the ECOWAS Chairmanship and informal regional security roles, have been used by 
authoritarian /hybrid leaders to create the space needed for undemocratic practices. Similarly, 
coup provisions, for example, cannot be denied to authoritarian leaders because coups are 
insecurity inducing and undemocratic. In addition, other states in the region, regional level 
authorities (ECOWAS) and external actors have had to make very difficult trade-offs in West 
Africa such as those between democracy and stability – especially around elections. Similarly, 
leaders with the capacity to contribute to regional security (such as Compaoré and, albeit 
outside of ECOWAS, Idriss Deby in Chad) have been able to use their security roles to deflect 
attention from their less-than-democratic regimes. Many of the regional functions described 
above are designed for weak and developing states or apply in a region characterised by state 
fragility and the regional functions to address these weaknesses can in some cases be used to 
bolster both regime types – democratic or authoritarian. Leaders such as Jammeh in Gambia, 
have much like leaders in some European countries, used rejection of the policies and actions 
of ECOWAS to legitimise themselves. Similarly, rejection of the ICC at the AU level provides 
a similar function. Finally, evidence discussed above shows also how overlapping regionalism, 
especially regarding the AU (which has a less democratic membership overall), also has the 
potential to provide leaders with certain forms of benefit.  
The fact that these ‘loopholes’ of democratic regionalism exist is in part a legacy of the fact 
both that ECOWAS and the AU had no initial democratic standards in terms of membership at 
their outset, have limited means for promoting democracy outside of major crises (such as 
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unconstitutional changes of government or unconstitutional efforts to extent term limits) and 
are tasked with providing benefits for all their members regardless of regime type. 
Authoritarian leaderships have been able to survive (for a time at least) alongside other 
democratising states, in part, by exploiting these gaps.  
Despite, the growth of democracy in West Africa, pockets of weak governance persist and 
backsliding towards authoritarian practices remain possible. Whilst the democratic record of 
ECOWAS as an institution inspires confidence (especially in response to crises c.f. the recent 
crisis in Gambia), regional cooperation appears to have, at times, presented support for both 
democracy and opportunities for authoritarian leaders simultaneously. The information 
presented here should thus be of interest to those both that would seek to insulate West Africa 
against any autocratic resurgence (as seen elsewhere: Diamond, Plattner and Walker [2016]; 
Freedom House [2017]) and those that would seek to encourage democracy in other parts of 
the African continent (and perhaps elsewhere too). While it is by no means easy, reducing the 
potentially mixed effects of regionalism for governance in Africa will support the growing 
democratic identity in the region with attendant benefits for security and development in the 
long term.  
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